University of Mississippi

eGrove
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

1-1-2019

Cognitive Influences On Preschoolers’ And Adults’ Eyewitness
Memory In Response To Misleading Questions
Tonya M. Vandenbrink

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Vandenbrink, Tonya M., "Cognitive Influences On Preschoolers’ And Adults’ Eyewitness Memory In
Response To Misleading Questions" (2019). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1804.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1804

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

COGNITIVE INFLUENCES ON PRESCHOOLERS’ AND ADULTS’ EYEWITNESS
MEMORY IN RESPONSE TO MISLEADING QUESTIONS

A Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Psychology
The University of Mississippi

by
TONYA M. VANDENBRINK
May 2020

Copyright Tonya M. Vandenbrink 2020
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ABSTRACT
The present study investigated cognitive influences on the malleability of memory for an
eyewitness event, specifically focusing on age, executive function, and divided attention.
Preschoolers (3- to 5-year-olds) and adults completed an executive function (EF) battery,
witnessed an event either under divided attention (DA) or full attention (FA), following this,
participants were asked a series of questions, the majority of which were misleading from the
Video Suggestibility Scale for Children. This study supports previous findings that children are
more suggestible than adults to misleading questions. However, there was no influence of EF on
suggestibility in either children or adults. Lastly, level of attention was related to suggestibility in
yield 1 scores, where those in the DA condition had higher suggestibility scores than those in the
FA condition, supporting previous findings in adult literature and extending these findings to the
preschool age.
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I INTRODUCTION
Cognitive Influences on Preschoolers’ and Adults’ Eyewitness Memory in Response to
Misleading Questions
It was estimated that over 13,000 children testify each year in sexual abuse cases (Ceci &
Bruck, 1993), with 40.65% of these children being seven years of age and under (Scullin & Ceci,
2001). Often, individuals (and especially children) interviewed during these cases encounter
suggestive techniques that can lead to the creation of false memories (Neuschatz, Lampinen,
Toglia, Payne, & Cisneros, 2007). These false memories can lead to drastic consequences, such
as innocent persons being convicted. In fact, there are several hundred documented cases of
innocent people being convicted of various crimes, with the Innocence Project exonerating by
DNA at least 22 people convicted based on false testimonies of others (The Innocence Project,
2017; Davis & Leo, 2012). In light of this information, research focused on better understanding
the malleability of memory across the lifespan for witnessed events is necessary to assist in
avoiding false convictions via false testimonies. The purpose of this study was to investigate
individuals’ suggestibility to a particular technique that is common across interrogations (i.e.,
misleading questions), with an emphasis on how developing abilities in cognitive control and the
management of attention impact suggestibility in young children and adults.
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Suggestibility in Response to Misleading Questions
Suggestibility is the degree to which a person is accepting of and incorporates another
person’s suggestion into their memory for an event (Ceci & Bruck, 1993), and could be due to a
variety of situations (e.g., repeated questioning, social incentives, memory visualization, see
Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, & Bruck, 1994; Garven, Wood, Malpass, & Shaw, 1998).
Suggestibility in response to misinformation (i.e., introduction of false information and details) is
among the most commonly studied instances of suggestibility dating back to the early 1900s
(Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Susceptibility to misinformation is typically studied in a three-phase
structure; 1) participants witness an event, 2) participants are provided with false information, 3)
participants are asked questions about the event to determine if they incorporated the false
information provided to them into their memory (Lampinen & Smith, 1995; Leding, 2012). For
example, in a study conducted by Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978), participants saw a car
accident take place and false information about the event was given to the participants while
questioned about the event “Did another car pass the red Datsun while it was stopped at the stop
sign?” (in the actual event it was a yield sign not a stop sign). Following this, participants were
asked to recall details about the event, “Did you see a stop sign?” or asked to recognize a scene
from the event. The “misinformation effect” occurs when subjects exposed to misleading
information for that event are more likely than a control group to choose a misleading option
later during recall (e.g., say “yes” to seeing a stop sign, see Ackil & Zaragoza, 1995; Huff,
Weinsheimer, & Bodner, 2016; Loftus, 2005). It is assumed that participants who incorporate
misinformation into memory for the event (Roebers & Schneider, 2000) may create a false
memory (i.e., memory they believe to be true but did not actually occur or contains inaccuracies,
Bruck, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1998; Loftus, 1979; Meade & Roediger, 2002; Leding, 2012).
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Although misinformation can come from a variety of sources (e.g., talking to others about
the event, viewing media coverage, suggestive interrogations, Bruck & Ceci, 1999), the most
common source of misinformation in interrogations is misinformation presented through
questioning or misleading questions (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987; Lampinen & Smith, 1995). In
a misleading question paradigm, the false information is introduced during the second phase of
the three-phase structure, in the form of a question (see the Loftus et al., 1978 example above).
In addition to prevalence, another reason why the misinformation during a questioning paradigm
is so well-studied is because misinformation is often introduced without the interrogators’
awareness (i.e., they believe the information they present to be true) or understanding of the
effect it can have on the subsequent testimony (Bruck & Ceci, 1999). Further, the use of
misleading questions is especially common with younger populations, because their free recall
often lacks details (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Price & Goodman, 1990; Roeber & Schneider, 2000)
and interrogators supplement questioning with additional information to assist in drawing out
detailed testimony. Unfortunately, the information provided to children during questioning is
often inaccurate leading to unreliable and potentially false testimony by children (Ceci & Bruck,
1993, Garven et al., 1998; Price & Goodman, 1990; Roeber & Schneider, 2000). Although
misinformation in questioning may be present to a lesser extent when interviewing older children
and adults, misleading questions still occur because of interviewer bias or to encourage more
detailed accounts (e.g., to extract the truth when the eyewitness appears to be lying or to reveal
details that were forgotten due to the traumatic experience of the crime, Ofshe & Leo, 1997).
In addition to misleading questions being more prevalent in younger samples, the
introduction of misinformation during questioning has more detrimental effects for younger
children (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Cohen & Harnick, 1980). For example, when exposed to
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misleading questions after having witnessed or engaged in an event, preschoolers (3- and 4-yearolds) more often incorrectly recognize the misinformation presented during questioning as
information obtained from the witnessed event and are more likely to give fewer correct accounts
of the event when compared to school age children (6- to 12-year-olds) and adults (Bruck &
Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Ceci et al., 1987; Ornstein, Gordon, & Larus, 1992). Further, 6year-olds are more likely to incorporate misinformation from suggestive questions into their
memory for an event compared to 9- to 16-year-olds (Cohen & Harnick, 1980). Thus, preschool
seems to be a period during which episodic memory for events is fragile and easily affected by
misleading questions, though older children and adults are not immune to misleading questions’
effects.
Frameworks Explaining Preschoolers’ Susceptibility to Misleading Questions
Social Frameworks. There are several reasons why preschool aged children may be
more suggestible to the misinformation effect when presented with misleading questions.
Socially, young children may fall vulnerable to suggestive information by social pressure (i.e.,
trying to please the interviewer, appealing to an authority figure, Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Research
has shown that children are more vulnerable to misleading questions when produced by an adult,
authority figure, a credible adult or child, or a person perceived as truthful, competent,
believable, and not deceptive (Ackil & Zaragoza, 1995; Ceci et al., 1987; Lampinen & Smith,
1995; Lippman, 1911; Loftus & Loftus, 1980). Lippman (1911) suggests a child’s thought
process through an interrogation from a person of authority is as follows: “If the respected
person who is questioning me expects such an answer, then it must be the right one.” Thus,
children rely heavily on authority figures and may expect them to be right leading them to
override their memory or be less confident in it than adults.
4

Source Monitoring Frameworks. Theories of cognitive explanations for susceptibility
to misleading questions primarily draw on source monitoring frameworks (Zaragoza & Lane,
1994, 1998; Lane, 2006). Source monitoring involves cognitive processes that allow for
representations and retention of the origins of memories to ensure that information is linked to
the correct source (Hala, Rasmussen, & Henderson, 2005; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay,
1993; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). While source-monitoring can be a controlled conscious effort
that is deliberate and involves the use of representations, most often source-monitoring is
automatic and conducted quickly without conscious awareness leaving room for errors (Johnson
et al., 1993). The source-monitoring hypothesis suggests that when witnesses are introduced to
misleading information they may confuse the source of the information with the witnessed event
itself (Johnson et al., 1993). When responding to misleading questions an automatic response
may be based on familiarity rather than reflecting on the representation of that memory
(Zaragoza & Lane, 1994).
There are individual differences in source monitoring, with better source monitoring
being associated with resisting suggestibility (Melinder, Endestand, & Magnussen, 2006). Source
monitoring has also been proposed as a potential reason why young children show more
susceptibility to misinformation compared to older children. A number of studies show
preschoolers have difficulty distinguishing between two or more separate sources of events in
memory when asked to consciously recall the source (Ackil & Zaragoza 1995; Ceci, Crotteau
Huffman, Smith, & Loftus, 1994; Poole & Lindsay, 1995; Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke,
1999). Further, major improvements in the ability to monitor external sources dramatically
increasing between 4- to 6-years of age (Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; Melinder et al.,
2006), likely linked to the substantial achievements in the ability to control and manage behavior
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and attention during this time period (i.e., in order to monitor sources, one must selectively
attend to and form a conscious representation for the source of the event).
One explanation for why children struggle with source monitoring may be due to the
underdeveloped cognitive processes that assist in source monitoring. The fact that a large body
of research shows that deficits in source monitoring relate to higher levels of suggestibility
across the lifespan (Ceci et al., 1994) and preschoolers show substantial deficits in source
monitoring compared to older samples (Ceci & Bruck, 1993), have led a number of theorists to
suggest source monitoring deficits as a primary cause for suggestibility to misleading questions
(Ceci et al., 1994). However, this source-monitoring framework likely only accounts for a
portion of the developmental progression seen in preschool. Individual contributions of the
conscious representational systems that allow for conscious reflection (Marcovitch & Zelazo,
2009) likely underlie and subsume issues with source monitoring. Thus, further work examining
how the foundational higher order cognitive processes developing during this period (Garon,
Bryson, & Smith, 2008, Posner & Rothbart, 1998) relate to suggestibility is necessary.
Cognitive Influences on Preschoolers’ Susceptibility to Misleading Questions
Executive Function. Broadly, executive function (EF) is defined as higher order
cognitive processes that underlie goal directed behavior (Epstien, 1973; Jacques & Marcovitch,
2010; Miyake & Friedman. 2012). Exercising EF is often required when automatic behavior is
insufficient (e.g., consciously reflecting and recalling a new parking location is necessary to
avoid automatically walking to your typical but incorrect spot; Diamond, 2006; Wheeler, Stuss,
& Tulving, 1997). EF plays a role in children’s and adults’ memory with the higher order
cognitive processes involved in EF thought to assist in encoding and retrieving information from
long-term memory (Alexander et al., 2002; Miller, Chatley, Marcovitch, & McConnell Rogers,
6

2014; Schacter, Kagan, & Leichtman, 1995). For instance, EF is needed to form a strong event
representation that can be maintained in long-term memory and is also needed during recall to
resist the urge to automatically draw on familiarity in memory (Kelley & Jacoby, 2000) and
consciously reflect on the appropriate memory trace (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009). Although
there are links between EF and suggestibility to misleading questions, there are several important
considerations that impact EF’s influence on suggestibility.
First, the structure of EF has been suggested to consist of three core components (i.e.,
inhibition, working memory, and cognitive flexibility, Diamond, 2006; Miyake & Friedman,
2012), which can relate differentially to social and cognitive abilities (e.g., Miller, Avila, &
Reavis, 2018; Miller et al., 2014). Inhibition is commonly measured through tasks that require
individuals to override the tendency to produce an automatic response (e.g., following a rule to
say a printed color word while inhibiting the tendency to read the words’ ink color, Stroop,
1935). Working memory (WM) is a process in which information is temporarily maintained and
manipulated (e.g., completing an ongoing task while maintaining other information in mind and
using new information to update task completion, Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Cognitive
flexibility, or set shifting, is the mental process of flexibly shifting between tasks or considering
multiple mental sets (e.g., switching the sorting of two-dimensional cards from one dimension to
a different conflicting dimension, Zelazo, 2006). These components are linked to suggestibility
in adults. For example, to resist suggestibility one must maintain current information about the
witnessed event in mind, update memory to reflect the sources of information and
misinformation, inhibit the tendency to rely on more automatic processing (e.g., recalling
anything familiar about the event, Kelley & Jacoby, 2000; Yonelinas, 2002), and rely on more
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conscious reflection to separate true information from misinformation when asked to recall the
event (Kapinski & Scullin, 2009; Scullin & Bronner, 2006).
Children’s abilities to execute these EF components show dramatic development during
the preschool years (Garon et al., 2008; Jacques & Marcovitch, 2010), thus, a second important
consideration in understanding EF’s relation to suggestibility is EF’s development across the
lifespan. According to Garon et al.’s (2008) integrated framework of EF in development, the
emergence of simple EF skills and executive attention networks (i.e., regulation of cognitive
processes to monitor and solve conflicts, Posner & Fan, 2008) together result in complex EF
skills. Links between EF and suggestibility to misleading questions align with this integrative EF
development. For instance, the ability to engage in inhibition increases from infancy to 5-years
of age, with the first instances of inhibition emerging in infancy and children under three
evidenced in Delay of Gratification inhibition tasks (e.g., inhibiting playing with an attractive toy
when asked not to, Garon et al., 2008). Inhibition in 3- to 5-year-olds is often measured with
complex inhibition tasks, requiring holding a rule in mind that is contrary to a dominant response
and responding according to the rule, such as the Day/Night Stroop (Garon et al., 2008). Higher
performance on complex inhibitory control tasks are related to less suggestibility when exposed
to misleading questions in children from 3- to 7-years-old, (Alexander et al., 2002; ClarkeStewart, Malloy, & Allhusen, 2004; Kapinski & Scullin, 2009; Roberts & Powell, 2005).
Initially, WM develops in infancy as holding information in mind over a delayed period of time
(Garon et al., 2008). More complex skills of WM develop throughout preschool allowing for
children to hold more information in mind while actively manipulating and updating that
information, (Carlson, 2005; Cragg & Nation, 2007; Garon et al., 2008). For example,
preschoolers’ WM is often measured with more complex WM tasks like the Self-Ordered
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Pointing task (SOPT; Petrides & Milner, 1982), which requires not only remembering a stimulus
but also choosing new stimuli while avoiding previously chosen stimuli. There is a negative
relationship between WM and suggestibility in children 3- to 5-years old when exposed to
misleading questions (Clarke-Steward et al., 2004; Kapinski & Scullin, 2009). Cognitive
flexibility is often thought of to be the last of the three core components of EF to develop due to
its prerequisite of both inhibition and WM (Garon et al., 2008). For instance, researchers have
consistently found that 4-year-olds and most 5-year-olds show major developments in cognitive
flexibility (i.e., particularly the ability to switch between mental sets) with large improvements
occurring during the ages of 5- to 11-years, peaking at the early 20’s (Carlson, 2005; Jacques &
Marcovitch, 2010; Diamond, 2006). Cognitive flexibility has been shown to have no relationship
with suggestibility to misleading questions in children 3- to 5-years old (Kapinski & Scullin,
2009), perhaps due to its late development when compared to the other components of EF.
Although the core components of EF are developing in preschool (Garon et al., 2008)
there is debate on whether the best way to conceptualize EF is by focusing on component
processes or a unitary EF ability. Other frameworks of early EF propose that EF may be best
represented in a unitary fashion during the first 6-years of life (Wiebe et al., 2011), where the
best model to describe the variability among multiple EF tasks is to extract a unitary factor
thought to display a common underlying ability known as common EF (i.e., the ability to form
and maintain representations that guide lower level processing toward a goal, Miyake &
Friedman, 2012). To date, EF links to misleading questioning research has only been
investigated in a componential way and suggests that separate abilities in EF such as inhibition
and working memory may play a role in suggestibility. However, research suggests that EF at
this age should be measured as a unitary factor because component abilities are not fully
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developed. Examination of a common EF during this period may be informative and align with
representational models of EF development (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009) suggesting that
component abilities are not necessarily key to controlled behavior and memory, rather what
underlies these component abilities is the common ability to form and use representations to
guide behavior that will be important to long-term memory formation.
Attention Influences. Attention during encoding of an event may also be a major
cognitive process that influences suggestibility to misleading questions. More specifically, the
executive attention network responsible for control over attention and detecting and resolving
conflict (Rothbart, Ellis, Rueda, & Posner, 2003) is likely important to memory. For instance,
executive attention is responsible for noticing critical details of a stimulus in the environment to
recall later (Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001) and some authors even go so far as to
define memory as selective attention to events or representations (Casey, Giedd, & Thomas,
2000). Simply not paying attention during an event can result in encoding problems, such as not
storing the information, resulting in recall issues later (Loftus, 2003). Further, one way the legal
system identifies an eyewitness as credible and accurate is by determining their level of attention
during the event (Lane, 2006).
One way to examine just how important attention is to accurate eyewitness memory in
response to misleading questions is to examine memory when attention is impaired. Divided
attention (DA) requires the ability to cognitively process multiple stimuli or perform multiple
tasks simultaneously (Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002). Often the results of DA are reflected in
diminished performance of a task (Johnston, Greenberg, Fisher, & Martin, 1970). Typically, the
effects of DA are measured by comparing one’s performance on a single task, with one’s
performance on the same task, while simultaneously performing another task (i.e., dual-task
10

performance, Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002). In a DA or dual-task paradigm, participants engage
in a primary task focused on memorizing some specific information while also performing a
secondary task (e.g., solving mathematical problems or card sorting; Craik, Govoni, NavehBenjamin, & Anderson, 1996; Wimmer & Howe, 2010). This paradigm also has practical
applications to the eyewitness testimony literature. Eyewitnesses in real world situations are
often in very stressful environments during the event and attentional resources are frequently
divided among multiple stimuli (e.g., the event itself, internal details such as thoughts and
feelings, and external details such as other nearby events), which can affect the quality of one’s
memory for the event (Zaragoza & Lane, 1998; Lane, 2006).
Empirical evidence shows that DA during encoding of eyewitness memory can lead to
errors in adults. For example, Lane (2006) found that when adult witnesses engage in DA (e.g.
listening to music while witnessing the event) during encoding of the event they were more
likely to include post-event suggested information into their memory of the event. Further, the
decrease in memory is enhanced when the secondary task is more complex (Craik et al., 1996). It
has repeatedly been found that DA has a negative impact on the encoding processes of memory
(e.g., making the initial memory less detailed) likely because DA reduces the availability of
attentional resources for complex cognitive processes, resulting in poorer memory recall
(Anderson et al., 2000; Craik et al., 1996; Fernades & Moscovitch, 2000; Kellog, Cocklin, &
Bourne, 1982; Park, Smith, Dudley, & Lafronza, 1989). This results in a less elaborate memory
representation for the event (Lane, 2006), because DA impairs the actual memory when
compared to full attention (Wimmer & Howe, 2010). When memory representations are missing
information, we often try to fill in the gaps (Greenberg, Westcott, & Bailey, 1998), this could
result in increased vulnerability to suggestive information when attempting to filling in the
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missing gaps in memory. However, the research examining attention links to eyewitness
memory, let alone misleading questions is lacking. A major gap in the literature is the effects of
DA on children’s memories. While there is a wide breadth of literature with adults, researchers
have yet to look at the effects of DA with children when faced with misleading questions, which
is surprising given the development of attentional networks in the preschool period (Garon et al.,
2008).
In childhood, there are two general attention systems hypothesized to guide attention: the
orienting or selective attention system and the executive attention network (Garon et al., 2008).
The selective attention system allows for exogenously controlled orientation to and shifting of
attention to an external stimulus, while the executive attention network allows for endogenous
control where attention is not guided by the environment but rather internally such as through
representations (Garon et al., 2008; Rothbart et al., 2003). The executive attention network is
hypothesized to emerge later than the selective attention system, with major developments
occurring between 3- to 5-years of age in the executive attention network (Garon et al., 2008).
Further the development of executive attention has been proposed as a cornerstone of controlled
behavior in EF development because of its assistance in focusing attention to a task while
avoiding irrelevant information and allowing for control of internal and external information
processing (Garon et al., 2008). A more developed executive attention network could through
representation lead to a better long-term memory performance, such as in recalling details of an
event. Perhaps the development of the executive attention network could also assist in better
allocation of attention during a DA task, resulting in less detrimental effects of DA on memory
recall.
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Developmentally, there are only a few studies examining DA and memory in children
and none to my knowledge examining DA and suggestibility to misleading questions in memory.
Wimmer and Howe (2010) found that 7- and 11-year-olds showed decreased memory for word
recognition when a DA paradigm (e.g., primary task being word memorization and an inhibition
Day/Night-Stroop task being the secondary task) was administered during encoding and that 7year-olds were affected more by DA than 11-year-olds. While Wimmer and Howe (2010) found
evidence of the effects of DA on memory recognition in children, they did not find evidence of
false memories as a result of DA. Taken together, DA and suggestibility to misleading questions
literature suggests older children and adults’ memory is influenced when attention is divided
during encoding and presentation of misinformation is used during questioning. Development in
young children suggest that they may show different patterns or be even more influenced
because of underdeveloped executive attention system - but this work has yet to be conducted.
The Present Study
During the preschool period, there are developmental changes in vulnerability to
suggestibility, with suggestibility to misleading questions decreasing with age (Bruck & Ceci,
1997, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Although this achievement has been linked to development in
source memory (Melinder et al., 2006), other major cognitive developments during the preschool
years in EF and attention (Jacques & Marcovitch, 2010) have yet to be examined as cognitive
influences on suggestibility to misleading questions. The main focus of this research was to
determine if cognitive abilities (i.e., EF and DA) influence vulnerability to suggestibility through
misleading information, how this affects preschooler (3- to 5-year-olds) suggestibility, and how
all preschooler’s suggestibility is comparable to adults.

13

To answer this question, preschoolers ages 3- to 5-years and adults were randomly
assigned to two conditions, either receiving dual-tasks (i.e., DA condition) or not receiving dual
tasks (i.e., Full Attention or FA condition) at encoding. All participants were administered three
EF tasks at the beginning of the session to measure WM, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility.
Following this, participants watched a video, which was the eyewitness event. Those in the DA
condition were given additional tasks to complete while watching the video. Those in the FA
condition were asked to give their full attention to watching the video. Following this,
participants were given two addition tasks that served as a delay between the witnessed event
and questioning. These tasks included the Maxi theory of mind task and a Day/Night Stroop task.
Lastly, participants were asked a series of recognition questions, most of which were misleading,
then participants were asked the same questions a second time. Total suggestibility was
calculated by including assents to misleading questions (i.e., Yield score) and answers changed
from the first time questioned to the second time questioned (i.e., Shift score, Wyler & Oswald,
2016).
I had five hypotheses related to the role that cognitive abilities in EF and DA would play
in suggestibility to misleading information. (H1) I expected children to be more suggestible than
adults and younger children (i.e., 3- and 4-year-olds) to be more suggestible than older children
(i.e., 5-year-olds, Ceci & Bruck, 1993). I also hypothesized (H2) that EF would predict
suggestibility (and potentially be an even more important predictor than age), suggesting that age
may be a proxy for the rapid development in EF (Garon, et al., 2008; Jacques & Marcovitch,
2010) that assists in individuals resisting suggestibility (e.g., holding and alternating between
information in mind may help keep sources straight and result in less suggestibility, Kapinski &
Scullin, 2009). With EF I hypothesized (H3) that both unitary and component EF
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conceptualizations would predict suggestibility, but in different ways. Specifically, when looking
at component EF abilities I expected both inhibition and working memory to contribute to
suggestibility, however based on the literature I did not expect cognitive flexibility to predict
suggestibility in children, primarily because cognitive flexibility has not shown to be related to
suggestibility in previous research which could be linked to its late development when compared
to other EF components. However, I expected cognitive flexibility to predict suggestibility in
adults since this EF component would be developed in this population.
For unitary measures of EF, I expected a better prediction of suggestibility to misleading
questions for children 3- to 5-years-old, than the individual components since EF is primarily
measured as a unitary component in the preschool period. However, since EF is often measured
as components in adults, I expected the EF componential framework to better predict
suggestibility to misleading questions for this age group. Regarding attention, I expected (H4)
that those in the DA condition would be more suggestible than those in the FA condition
(Wimmer & Howe, 2010), but this effect would depend on EF ability (H5). More specifically,
the eyewitness memory of individuals with lower EF abilities would be more influenced by DA
because they have less cognitive resources to draw from during eyewitness events. Further, if EF
abilities are already low, then any disruption in attention would have a greater effect on EF
abilities, which I proposed would further result in increased vulnerability to suggestive
misleading questions (Garon, et al., 2008). Lastly, I explored the possible age interactions to
examine whether age interactions accounts for additional variance once accounting for EF.
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II Methods
Participants
Participants included 30 3-year-olds (M=3.56, SD=.25), 30 4-year-olds (M=4.42,
SD=.26), 30 5-year-olds (M=5.37, SD=.30), and 80 adults (M=19.99, SD=1.68). Children were
recruited from preschools around the Oxford, MS area and from a database of parents interested
in child development research. Children were tested in both preschools and an on-campus
laboratory at the University of Mississippi. For their participation, children received a small toy
(e.g., toy car, figurine). Adult subjects were students from the University of Mississippi SONA
research pool. For their participation adults were given research credit through the SONA site.
Of the final child sample, 48 participants were female. Of those who reported demographics the
majority of children came from households that made between $100,000 – over $140,000 yearly
(68.26%), 31.74% made less than 80,000. Ninety-Six percent of participants primarily spoke
English, with 10.1% of participants being bilingual. Eighty-four percent of participants were
White (non-Hispanic), 1.5% were Black/African American, 9% were Asian/Pacific Islander,
1.5% affiliated with other, and 4.5% were of multiple races. Ninety-seven percent of children
came from households were their parents were married. Of the final adult sample, 57 participants
were female. Of those who reported demographics the majority of households made between
$80,000 – over $140,000 yearly (65.4%), 30% made less than 79,000, 12% did not report
household income. Ninety-three percent of participants primarily spoke English, with 15.8% of
participants being bilingual. Sixty-six percent of participants were White (non-Hispanic), 19%
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were Black/African American, 10% were Asian/Pacific Islander, and 5% were of multiple races.
Only 2.5% of adult participants were married.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned into one of two levels of attention, DA condition
(i.e., receiving dual-tasks) or FA condition (i.e., not receiving dual tasks) during encoding of the
eyewitness event. All participants were administered the three EF tasks in a fixed order at the
beginning of the session to measure WM, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility. Following this
they watched a video. Those in the DA condition were given an additional task (i.e., Day/Night
Stroop) to complete while they watched the video and were instructed to “please pay close
attention to the video, as you will be asked some questions about the video later. In addition, you
will be playing a sorting game in which you need to try to do as well as you can.” Those in the
FA condition purely watched the video and were instructed “please pay close attention to the
video, as you will be asked some questions about the video later”. Following this, participants
engaged in a theory of mind task and a secondary Day/Night Stroop which served as a delay
between viewing the video and questioning. Participants were then asked a series of yes/no
questions about events in the video, where 14 out of 18 questions were misleading, see Appendix
A (Scullin & Ceci, 1999; Wyler & Oswald, 2016). The set of questions were asked a second time
following negative feedback. All but two tasks (i.e., the SOPT and the DA task) were presented
to participants on a Surface Pro 3 via the SuperLab 5.0 programming software.
Pilot Testing
This study was piloted on 13 preschoolers (i.e., seven 3-year-olds, three 4-year-olds, and
three 5-year-olds). Early on it was evident that during the DA task children were not sorting the
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Day/Night cards while watching the movie. Originally the DA task was performed completely on
the computer, with the video playing on the top portion of the computer screen and the
Day/Night Stroop game playing in the lower portion of the computer screen. Children were
instructed; “please pay close attention to the video located on the top of the screen, you will be
asked some questions about the video later. In addition, there will be game displayed at the
bottom of the screen for you to engage while the video plays. You must continue to play the
game until the video is over. Your score on the game will also be recorded so please try to do as
well as you can.”. However, children would only sort the card when given reminders “please
remember to continue the card game”. In addition, some children were performing poorly for
their age on the Stroop task (e.g., one 4-year-old got 12/50 correct), likely due to focusing their
attention on the video rather than the game. Given this insight, the Day/Night was altered to
increase participation by requiring children to physically sort the cards given to them by the
researcher into boxes the were located directly below the computer screen. This change resulted
in more participation on the task meant to divide attention (i.e., Day/Night Stroop).
In addition, piloting revealed that participants were easily able to accurately recall events
from the video during questioning when they were directly questioned after the observation,
regardless of attention condition. Many eyewitness studies include some type of delay between
witnessing the event and questioning. Researchers suggest that when there is a delay between an
event and questioning, that new reports given by children during repeated misleading questions,
are commonly false because children’s memory of the original event fades over time allowing
for misinformation to fill in the gaps in their memory (Bruck & Ceci, 1999). Further, previous
research with the VCCS used a delay of 1-3 days and 7-10 days between witnessing the event
and being questioned (Scullin & Ceci, 2001). For these reasons, a delay was added into the
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study. While a delay of a day or longer was not feasible for data collection for this study a
shorter delay was implanted. Two tasks, a theory of mind task and a Day/Night Stroop task, were
added between viewing the video and questioning. These tasks served as delay but were chosen
based on their developmental compatibility to other developmental components and tasks in this
study. For instance, theory of mind (ToM, understanding that others have thoughts and beliefs
different from our own, and those thoughts and beliefs drive behavior, Gopnik & Astington,
1988) is related to the development of EF throughout the preschool years (Miller & Marcovitch,
2012). In addition, ToM has also been shown to be negatively related to suggestibility (Bruck &
Melnyk, 2004; Scullin & Bonner, 2006). With these links to other cognitive processes within the
study ToM could serve not only as a delay task but it could potentially serve as an exploratory
variable. The Day/Night Stroop was chosen as it was thought that performance on the Day/Night
Stroop during the delay could be compared to performance on the Day/Night Stroop during the
DA paradigm as a way to check whether attention effectively was divided.
EF Measures
Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS; Zelazo, 2006). The DCCS measures cognitive
flexibility and is appropriate for individuals from 3 years of age to adulthood (Zealzo, 2006).
Children and adult versions of the DCCS differed slightly in the number of cards required to sort
for each phase.
Child version. For the first two phases there were two target cards (e.g., a yellow car and
a green flower) and six testing cards (e.g., three green cars and three yellow flowers) that
participants sorted in a random sequence, see Figure 1. In the preswitch phase participants were
instructed to sort cards according to one dimension (e.g., color), after all six cards were sorted
participants moved on to the postswitch phase. In the postswitch phase participants were
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introduced to the same two target cards but were now instructed to sort according to a different
dimension (e.g., shape), after all six cards were sorted participants moved onto a second
postswitch phase. The second postswitch phase had the same two target cards. In addition, there
were four possible test cards, each with a border and without a border. This phase consisted of 12
test cards total, with rules that varied based on whether the card had a border or not. Participants
were instructed to sort by one dimension (e.g., color) if there was a border around the picture,
however, if there was no border around the picture they were instructed to sort by another
dimension (e.g., shape). This task was administered on the computer and the total number of
correctly sorted cards on the first postswitch phase and response times were recorded, each
response time began as soon as the card appeared on the screen and ended as soon as the
participant chose a button.
Adult version. For the first two phases there were two target cards (e.g., a yellow car and
a green flower) and 12 testing cards (e.g., three green cars and three yellow flowers) that
participants sorted in a random sequence, see Figure 1. In the preswitch phase participants were
instructed to sort cards according to one dimension (e.g., color), after all 12 cards were sorted
participants moved on to the postswitch phase. In the postswitch phase participants were
introduced to the same two target cards but were now instructed to sort according to a different
dimension (e.g., shape), after all 12 cards were sorted participants moved onto a second
postswitch phase. The second postswitch phase had the same two target cards but consisted of 24
test cards with rules that varied. Participants were instructed to sort cards according to the
prompt given on the screen, the prompt “color” or “shape” appeared on the screen for each trail.
Trials were mixed so participants could not anticipate which prompt would appear. This task was
administered on the computer and the total number of correctly sorted cards on the second
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postswitch phase and response times were recorded, each response time began as soon as the
card appeared on the screen and ended as soon as the participant chose a button.
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Pre-& Postswitch

2nd Postswitch

Figure 1. Dimensional Change Card Sort Task
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Self-ordered Pointing Task (SOPT; Cragg & Nation, 2007; Petrides & Milner,
1982). The SOPT measures working memory and is appropriate for individuals 3 years of age to
adults. There were five levels in this task with each level consisting of multiple cards depicting
several pictures presented in a different spatial arrangement, see Figure 2. Each level gets
increasingly more difficult than the last, as the number of cards and pictures on each card
increases by two. For example, the first level depicted in Figure 2 consisted of four pictures per
card with four cards total in the level. Participants were presented with cards one at a time and
were required to point to a different picture for each card they saw (i.e., all of the pictures must
be touched once), thus they must remember which pictures they pointed to on previous cards to
select a new picture. After participants were shown all four cards in level one, they move onto
the next level which consisted of a larger set size (i.e., six pictures per card, six total cards). This
continued until all five levels were completed, the highest level consisted of 10 pictures per card
with 10 cards total. No feedback was given at any time during this task, except to remind
participants of the rules prior to beginning a new level (i.e., “do not touch a picture that you’ve
already touched”). The number of correctly selected pictures was recorded for each level as well
the overall total number of errors and overall total correct choices which was out of 40. This task
was presented in a book format in which the page was turned after each card, there was a blank
page between levels to indicate the next level was about to begin. There were two versions of
this task, one administered to children the other administered to adults. As with pervious use of
this task the child version consisted of pictures on the pages (e.g., balloon, baby, hose, elephant)
while the adult version consisted of abstract designs on the pages (e.g., large strips, small stripes,
squiggly lines, chevron lines). The number pictures selected only once out of 40 was recorded.
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Card 1

Card 2

Card 3

Card 4

Figure 2. Self-Ordered Pointing Task
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Card 1

Card 2

Card 3

Card 4

Figure 2. Self-Ordered Pointing Task
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Stroop Tasks (Gerstadt, Joo Hong, & Diamond, 1994; Stroop, 1935). The Stroop is a
measure of inhibition. Children and adults received different versions of the Stroop to adjust for
age appropriateness. Children were administered the Grass/Snow Stroop (Gerstadt, Joo Hong, &
Diamond, 1994) and adults were given the Stroop Color-Word Task (Stroop, 1935).
Children Stroop Task Grass/Snow (Gerstadt, Joo Hong, & Diamond, 1994). The Stroop
Task Grass/Snow measures inhibition in children 3-years and up. The participant saw a green
grass card and a white snow card on the screen. There were corresponding buttons on the
response pad with the stimuli. During familiarization, the participant simultaneously heard the
word “snow” and saw the “snow” card on the screen and was instructed to select the green grass
button and when the participant simultaneously heard the word “grass” and saw the “grass” card
on the screen the participant was instructed to select the white snow button, see Figure 3. After
instructions there were two training trials in which participants sorted a grass card and a snow
card correctly for each trial before moving onto testing. There were a total of 16 testing trials
(i.e., presented in random order: g, s, s, g, s, g, g, s, s, g, s, g, g, s, g, s), the total number of cards
correctly selected out of 16 was recorded. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as
possible and their first response was recorded. Participants were not given feedback. This task
was completed on the computer.
Adult Stroop Color-Word Task (Stroop, 1935). The Stroop Task measures inhibition in
adults. Participants were instructed to say aloud the ink color of the word rather than the printed
word (e.g., for the word “red” printed in the color “blue”, the correct response was “red”, see
Figure 4). There were three blocks given in the following order; congruent trials (i.e., word “red”
printed in the color “red”), color of bar trials (i.e., XXXX’s printed in the color “red”), and
incongruent trials (i.e., the word “red” printed in the color “blue”). Each block had 24 trials
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within it. Participants were instructed to say the color of the ink for each word or XXXX’s as
quickly as possible depending on the block and to leave no errors uncorrected. Reaction times for
each block included the time it took to complete all 24 trials with correcting for errors as
measured by a stopwatch and the number of correctly labeled trials out of 24 for each block (first
responses were recorded) were recorded. Interference scores were calculated by subtracting the
number correct on congruent trails from the number correct on the incongruent trials. A negative
score would reflect low inhibition while a positive score would reflect higher inhibition. The
stimuli was presented on the computer, verbal responses were recorded by voice recorder, and
trials were timed with a stopwatch.
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Grass/Snow Stroop:

Snow

Grass

Sun/Moon Stroop:

Night

Day

Figure 3. Children’s Stroop Tasks
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Congruent Trials

Red
Green
Yellow
Green
Yellow
Green
Blue
Red
Blue
Red
Blue
Yellow
Red
Blue
Yellow
Blue
Red
Blue
Green
Yellow
Red
Green
Yellow
Green

Color of Bar Trials

XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX

Figure 4. Adult Stroop Task

29

Incongruent Trials

Green
Blue
Green
Red
Green
Blue
Green
Yellow
Red
Red
Green
Yellow
Green
Red
Blue
Yellow
Blue
Blue
Blue
Red
Yellow
Red
Yellow
Yellow

Delay Tasks
The following two tasks were included to serve as delay tasks between participants
witnessing the event (i.e., the video) and being questioned about the event.
Maxi False Belief Task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This task measures theory of mind
and is appropriate for children as young as 3-years-old. Participants were read a story about a
character named Maxi who has a false belief about the location of an object, see Figure 5. Maxi
puts chocolate into cupboard x. While he is gone his mother puts the chocolate into cupboard y.
When Maxi returns participants are asked two questions; where Maxi will look for the object
(i.e., false belief question) and where the object really is (i.e., reality question). If participants are
able to identify that Maxi has a false belief about the object’s location, they would identify
cupboard x as the cupboard that Maxi would look in, which is different from their knowledge of
where the object is actually located, cupboard y. Participants responses were recorded as correct
or incorrect. This task was administered via story book presentation to both child and adult
participants. 1
Stroop Task Day/Night (Gerstadt, Joo Hong, & Diamond, 1994). The Stroop Task
Day/Night measures inhibition in children 3- to 6-years of age. The participant saw a white day
card and a black night card on the screen. There were corresponding buttons on the response pad
with the stimuli. During familiarization, the participant saw the “day” card on the screen and was
instructed to select the night button and when the participant saw the “night” card on the screen
the participant was instructed to select the day button, see Figure 3. After instructions there were

1

ToM was not reported in the results for two reasons. First it was not a variable of initial interest. Second, while
this variable could be exploratory, preliminary analysis revealed it was not correlated with suggestibility, resulting
in no further follow-up analyses, thus it served primarily as a delay task in the present experiment.
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two training trials in which participants sorted a day card and a night card correctly for each trial
before moving onto testing. There were a total of 16 testing trials (i.e., presented in random
order: n, d, d, n, d, n, n, d, d, n, d, n, n, d, n, d), the total number of cards correctly selected out of
16 was recorded. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible and their first
response was recorded. Participants were not given feedback. This task was completed on the
computer.
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Figure 5. Theory of mind, Maxi False Belief Task
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Suggestibility and DA Measures
Suggestibility Video (Scullin & Ceci, 2001). The video was of a child’s birthday party
and was created by Scullin and Ceci (2001) and lasted approximately five minutes. The birthday
party was for a boy named Billy and took place at his house with his mother, father, and friends
(Tammy, Suzie, Robin). During the party Tammy and Suzie peek inside a bag at a present. Billy
describes his friend Robin as clumsy, she later trips and falls, and drops cake on herself. When
Billy opens his presents, he sees that his toy (which was in the bag that Tammy and Suzie peeked
in) is broken and this upsets him. Following this a cake is brought out, Billy blows out the
candles, and a smoke alarm goes off in the kitchen due to the candles on the cake. Everyone is
assured that the smoke alarm is a false alarm and the children eat the cake concluding the video.
Participants are instructed to pay close attention to the video “story” as they will be questioned
about it later.
There were two conditions in this task. Participants in the full attention (FA) condition
were instructed to watch the video. Participants in the divided attention (DA) condition were
instructed to watch the video, while also engaging in a Day/Night Stroop task (Gerstadt, Joo
Hong, & Diamond, 1994). The video appeared on the computer screen and the Day/Night Stroop
was conducted manually with the researcher on the table in front of the computer. The Day/Night
Stroop was chosen as a secondary task in the DA paradigm because of its previous use as a DA
task with children (Wimmer & Howe, 2010). During the ongoing task participants were
presented with 50 trials (i.e., 25 day cards and 25 night cards, presented in random order), that
were evenly distributed throughout the five minute video in which participants were instructed to
place the card in the opposite box of the picture presented (i.e., a Day card goes in the Night box,
a Night card goes in the Day box). A researcher handed each card to the participant and
33

reminded the participants to “please remember to continue the card task” if they failed to sort a
card after five seconds of it being handed to them. Typically, the Day/Night Stroop is 16 trials
however for the task to run for the entire video length it was extended to 50 trials. This
adjustment was made based on continuous DA tasks in the adult literature. The overall number
of cards sorted, and the number of correctly sorted cards was recorded to ensure that participants
engaged in the task as a measure of DA.
For adults, this task was further altered to include the Grass/Snow Stroop task as well, as
researchers found it easy to complete the Day/Night task while watching the video without
dividing attention. Thus, adults had to sort Day, Night, Grass, and Snow cards into their correct
box (e.g., a Day card goes in the Night box, a Night card goes in the Day box, a Grass card goes
into Snow box, Snow card goes into Grass box), adults received 100 cards (i.e., 25 day cards, 25
night cards, 25 grass cards, and 25 snow cards, presented in random order) to sort throughout the
5 minute video. The overall number of cards sorted, and the number of correctly sorted cards was
recorded to ensure that participants engaged in the task as a measure of DA.
Leading questions (Scullin & Ceci, 2001). A total of 18 forced choice yes/no questions
about the video were administered verbally by the experimenter after participants completed all
other tasks. These questions were obtained from the Scullin and Ceci’s (2001) paper on
suggestibility. Four of the questions were non-suggestive (i.e., where the information was true to
the video such as ‘Was there a girl named Suzie at the party?’) with the remaining 14 being
suggestive (i.e., where the information was not true to the video, e.g., ‘Did the two girls arrive at
the party in a bright red car?’, see Appendix A for a full list of questions). Following all 18
questions participants went through the questions again under the guise of feedback (i.e., ‘you
missed a few of the questions. Let’s go through them again and see if you can do better this
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time’). A yield 1 score was calculated in response to the first administration of the questions (i.e.,
number of assents to suggestive questions during the first administration of questions). A yield 2
score was calculated in response to the second administration of the questions (i.e., number of
assents to suggestive questions during the second administration of questions). A shift score was
calculated in response to the re-administration of the questions during feedback (i.e., changes to
original answers to the initial question after feedback was given during the second administration
of questions). A total suggestibility score was calculated by adding the number of yield 1 scores
to the total number of shifts (Scullin & Ceci, 2001). See Appendix B.
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III Results
Missing Data and Descriptive Statistics
One adult participant reported being red/green color blind resulting in them being
dropped from the hierarchical regression and GLM analysis in a listwise deletion. There were no
other instances of missing data. EF tasks were originally proposed to be analyzed in a unitary
fashion for children and a componential fashion for adults. However, EF tasks were not highly
correlated among children or adults, see Tables 2 & 3. Thus, EF tasks were analyzed in a
componential fashion for both children and adults. Descriptive statistics for each EF task by age
can be found in Table 1.2

2

EF was run as a unitary component for the child sample and revealed a similar pattern of results.
36

Table 1

Mean

Adults
SD
Range
-1.080.17
0.17
0.36
15-16
1.26
19-24
1.96
30-39
1.81
0-7

Stroop
13.17 3.24
2-16
13.93 2.60
6-16
13.97 2.74
7-16
-0.06
Day/Night Stroop 12.33 4.12
1-16
14.20 1.70 11-16
14.57 1.61 10-16
15.85
DCCS
1.17 1.86
0-6
2.57 2.64
0-6
3.80 2.43
0-6
22.91
SOPT
34.37 2.80 28-40
35.50 2.56 29-39
36.63 2.06 32-39
35.33
Yield 1
8.57 3.32
2-14
7.20 3.44
2-14
5.80 3.60
0-14
1.93
Total
Suggestibility
13.17 4.20
3-21
11.83 4.23
3-20
11.33 4.39
4-25
6.03 4.59
0-32
Note. Stroop reflects number correct out of 16 on the Grass/Snow Stroop for children and the difference in interference scores
between congruent and incongruent Stroop trials for adults. Day/Night Stroop reflects the number of correctly sorted cards out
of 16 for both adults and children. DCCS reflects the number correct out of 6 on the postswitch phase for children and number
correct out of 24 on the second postswitch phase for adults. SOPT reflects the number of novel picture choices out of 40 for
both adults and children. Yield 1 scores reflect the number of times both children and adults assented to suggestive questions,
of which there were 14. Total suggestibility reflects the combination of yield 1 scores and shift scores for both adults and
children.
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Variables

3-year-olds
Mean SD Range

Descriptive Statistics by Age
4-year-olds
5-year-olds
Mean SD Range
Mean SD Range

Table 2
7
8
.455** -.281**
.235*
-.067
.301** -.203+
.041
-.119
.090
.189+
.201+ -.197+
-.169
-

9
-.089
-.076
-.082
.008
.109
-.110
-.209*
.671**
-
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Variables
1. Exact Age
2. DCCS Postswitch
3. SOPT
4. Grass/Snow Stroop
5. Level of Attention
6. Day/Night Stroop
7. Theory of Mind
8. Yield 1
9. Total Suggestibility
Note. **p<.01, *p<.05,
+p<.10

Correlations Among Measures for Children (N=90)
1
2
3
4
5
6
- .453** .362**
.114
-.017
.246*
.195+
.002
-.053
.084
.201+
-.021 .385**
.039 .446**
.074
-

Table 3

-

7
.066
-.097
.019

8
.060
.047
-.107

9
-.014
.138
-.081

-.032

-.055

-.033

-.081

-.020

-

.070
-

.113
.268*
-

.432**
.080
.121
-

.225*
.056
.075
.627**

Note. **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10. Correlations with Interference Stroop N=78 due to missing data for
Red/Green colorblind participant. All other correlations N=80.

-
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Variables
1. Exact Age
2. DCCS Mix Trials
3. SOPT
4. Interference
Stroop
5. Level of
Attention
6. Day/Night Stroop
7. Theory of Mind
8. Yield 1
6. Total
Suggestibility

Correlations Among Measures for Adults (N=80)
1
2
3
4
5
6
- -.204+
-.160
-.023
.273*
-.047
.134
-.013
-.050
.082
.018
-.013
.070

Performance on EF tasks were converted into Z-scores for the purpose of comparing the
child and adult populations performance to create a single predictor variable for each EF task.
The number of correctly sorted cards out of 16 on the Grass/Snow Stroop was a measure of
inhibition for children, this score was then converted into a standardized Z-score (i.e., averaging
the mean across all age groups; 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, and calculating how their score varied
from the mean). While adults’ incongruent-congruent interference scores for the Color Stroop
reflected their inhibition score and was converted into a standardized Z-score, to enable merging
of scores from the two different populations as a single predictor variable, inhibition
performance, as measured through the Stroop.
The number of correct out of 6, on the first postswitch phase of the DCCS was a measure
of cognitive flexibility for children, this score was then converted into a standardized Z-score
(i.e., averaging the mean across all age groups; 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, and calculating how their
score varied from the mean). The number of correct out of 24, on the second postswitch phase of
the DCCS was a measure of cognitive flexibility for adults, this score was converted into a
standardized Z-score to enable merging of scores from the two different populations as a single
predictor variable, cognitive flexibility performance, as measured through the DCCS.
The SOPT, which measures working memory was calculated as the number of correct
choices out of 40 and was the same measurement for both children and adults. SOPT scores were
converted into a standardized Z-score to maintain uniformity with other Z-score converted
variables. Z-scores for the SOPT were created for children across all age groups score (i.e.,
averaging the mean across all age groups; 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, and calculating how their score
varied from the mean), and for adults to enable merging of scores from the two different
populations as a single predictor variable, working memory as measured through the SOPT.
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The Effects of Age, EF, and Divided Attention on Total Suggestibility
To test my hypotheses regarding whether age, EF, and divided attention would influence
total suggestibility, a hierarchical regression was conducted. Prior to conducting a hierarchical
regression, the relevant assumptions of this statistical analysis were tested. The assumptions of
independence, homoscedasticity, and linearity were all met. Although total suggestibility was not
normally distributed, W (170) = .96, p < .001, there were no floor or ceiling effects in the DV
and each group has a sample size of 30 or larger, suggesting the use of a hierarchical regression
to analyze the data was still appropriate (Field, 2013).
Preschool Aged Children. Results from the hierarchical regression for the preschool
sample are presented in Table 4. In the first step, age was entered as a continuous variable to test
the prediction that age would influence total suggestibility scores. Unexpectedly, results
indicated that age was not a significant predictor of total suggestibility, explaining only 0.81% of
the variance in total suggestibility F (1, 88) = 0.71, p = .40.
In step 2, three EF tasks were entered to determine whether EF contributed to the
concurrent prediction of total suggestibility scores above and beyond that accounted for by age.
This step was not significant and only accounted for an incremental 0.50% of variance in total
suggestibility, F (3, 85) = 0.14, p = .93, nor were any of the coefficients related to the individual
EF predictors significant, indicating that the individual EF elements did not significantly relate to
total suggestibility once age was accounted for in the model.
In step 3, level of attention (i.e., either DA or FA) was entered to test the prediction that
those in the DA paradigm would have a higher suggestibility score than those in the FA
paradigm. This step was also not significant, indicating that level of attention did not
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significantly influence total suggestibility and accounted for only 1.11% of additional variance in
total suggestibility, F (1, 84) = 0.93, p = .34. In addition, the interaction between level of
attention and age on total suggestibility was not significant either and accounted for an
incremental 0.47% of variance in total suggestibility, F (1, 83) = 0.40, p = .53, see step 4.
Finally, to test the prediction that the influence of EF performance on total suggestibility
would differ by level of attention, step 5 included the interaction of each EF task and level of
attention. Results indicated these interactions were not significant and accounted for an
incremental 3.42% of total variance in total suggestibility, F (3, 80) = 0.97, p = .41. Suggesting
the influence of EF performance on total suggestibility did not significantly differ by level of
attention.
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Table 4
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Children; Influences of Total Suggestibility (Coefficients Listed by
Step)
Variable
B
SE B
β
ΔR2
CI 95%
Significance
Block 1
.008
.40
Exact Age
-0.49
0.58
-.09
-1.63 - 0.66
.40
Block 2
.005
.93
Grass/Snow Stroop (No. correct out of
16)
0.11
0.47
.03
-0.83 - 1.06
.81
DCCS (No. correct on postswitch trials)
-0.18
0.52
-.04
-1.21 - 0.86
.77
SOPT (No. correct out of 40)
-0.26
0.51
-.06
-1.27 - 0.74
.60
Block 3
.011
.34
Attention (DA/FA)
0.89
0.93
.10
-0.95 - 2.73
.34
Block 4
.005
.53
Exact Age by Level of Attention
-0.75
1.19
-.40
-3.12 - 1.62
.53
Block 5
.034
.41
Stroop by Attention
-0.85
0.96
-.14
-0.92 - 1.81
.38
DCCS by Attention
-1.55
1.06
-.26
-0.89 - 2.14
.15
SOPT by Attention
-0.14
1.04
-.03
-1.59 - 1.51
.89

Adults. Adults were run in a separate hierarchical regression due to the large age gap
between the adult and child sample and because procedures were slightly different for adult and
child samples (i.e., DCCS, SOPT, and Stroop are measured differently for age appropriateness).
Results from the hierarchical regression are presented in Table 5. A hierarchical regression was
conducted to determine the influence of age, EF, and divided attention on total suggestibility in
adults. Age was entered as a continuous variable in step 1. As expected, age did not explain any
variance (R2 < .001) in total suggestibility, F (1, 76) = 0.01, p = .92.
In step 2, three EF tasks were entered to determine whether EF contributed to the
concurrent prediction of total suggestibility scores above and beyond that accounted for by age.
This step was not significant and only explained 3.68% of the variance in total suggestibility
scores, F (3, 73) = 1.01, p = .43. In addition, the coefficients related to the individual EF
predictors were not significant, indicating that the individual EF elements did not significantly
influence total suggestibility once age was accounted for in the model.
In step 3, attention (i.e., either DA or FA) was entered to test the prediction that those in
the DA paradigm would have a higher suggestibility score than those in the FA paradigm. This
step was significant and explained an incremental 5.15% of the variance in total suggestibility
scores, F (1, 72) = 4.02, p = .05. Results indicate that those in the DA condition were associated
with higher total suggestibility scores than those in the FA condition. However, the interaction
between attention and age on total suggestibility was not significant and only explained an
incremental 0.19% of variance in total suggestibility scores, F (1, 71) = 0.15, p = .70. Thus, the
effect of attention on total suggestibility does not change with age.
Finally, to test the prediction that the influence of EF performance on total suggestibility
would differ by level of attention, step 5 included the interaction of each EF task and level of
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attention. Results indicated this step was not significant and explained an incremental 0.51% of
variance in total suggestibility scores, F (3, 68) = 0.13, p = .94. Further, none of the coefficients
related to the interaction between EF and attention level was significant, suggesting the influence
of EF performance on total suggestibility did not significantly differ by level of attention.
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Table 5
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Adults; Influences of Total Suggestibility (Coefficients Listed by Step)

Block 1
Exact Age
Block 2
Color Stroop (Interference score)
DCCS (No. correct on postswitch trials)
SOPT (No. correct out of 40)
Block 3
Attention (DA/FA)
Block 4
Exact Age by Attention
Block 5
Stroop by Attention
DCCS by Attention
SOPT by Attention

B

SE B

β

ΔR2

CI 95%
.00

-0.04

0.31

-.01

-0.07
0.53
0.86
-0.51

-.02
.18
-.11

-0.66 - 0.59
.04

0.58
0.54

-1.13 - 0.99
-0.30 - 2.02
-1.58 - 0.57
.05

2.18

1.09

.24

0.01 - 4.34
.00

-0.31

0.82

-.70

-1.94 - 1.32
.01

-0.32
0.63
0.19

1.60
1.20
1.10

-.06
.10
.03

-3.51 - 2.88
-1.75 - 3.02
-1.99 - 2.37

Significance
.92
.92
.43
.90
.14
.35
.05
.05
.70
.70
.94
.85
.60
.86
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Variable

Comparing adult and child samples (Age, EF, and Divided Attention) on total
suggestibility. In addition to running adult and child samples individually, I also wanted to
investigate the effects of age (i.e., comparing children to children and children to adults) on total
suggestibility.
To compare the adult and child samples a single GLM was conducted on total
suggestibility score with age (discrete), EF tasks (z-scores for DCCS, SOPT, Stroop), attention
(DA/FA), age by attention interaction, and EF by attention interaction as predictors. This
analysis revealed a significant main effect of age on total suggestibility F (1, 158) = 42.99, p <
.001. A follow up one-way ANOVA with Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) post hoc
comparisons was conducted to determine how age contributed to total suggestibility. For the
purpose of this analysis age was entered as a discrete variable (i.e., grouped by 3-, 4-, 5- yearolds, and adults). While 3-year-olds (M = 13.17, SD = 4.20) have the highest total suggestibility
score followed by 4-year-olds (M = 11.83, SD = 4.23), then 5-year-olds (M = 11.33, SD = 4.40),
with adults (M = 6.03, SD = 4.59) having the lowest total suggestibility score, there is only a
significant difference between 3-year-olds and adults, 4-year-olds and adults, and 5-year-olds
and adults ps < .001, see Table 6. Results suggest that there is an influence of age on total
suggestibility scores, with children being more suggestible than adults. All other variables did
not significantly relate to total suggestibility ps > .07.
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Table 6
Age
3-year-olds
4-year-olds
5-year-olds
Adults

Mean Suggestibility Scores by Age
Total Suggestibility
Yield 1 Scores
13.17
8.57
11.83
7.20
11.33
5.80
6.01
1.90
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The Effects of Age, EF, and Divided Attention on Yield 1 Scores
In addition to total suggestibility, yield 1 scores were also examined. Previous research
suggests that yield 1 scores may be a better indicator of suggestibility than total suggestibility
scores (Scullin & Warren, 1999, as cited in Scullin & Ceci, 2001). The following analysis was
conducted similar to the hierarchical regression above. Children and adults were analyzed
separately due the large age gap and different methodology between the two samples. All steps
in the hierarchical regression are the same as the previous hierarchical regression. EF
components were all analyzed as Z-scores.
Preschool Aged Children. Results from the hierarchical regression are presented in
Table 7. In the first step, age was entered as a continuous variable to test the prediction that age
would influence yield 1 scores. Results indicated that age was a significant predictor of yield 1
scores, accounting for 7.89% of the variance in yield 1 scores, F (1, 88) = 7.54, p = .007. This
reveals that as children are getting older, they are assenting less to suggestive questions (i.e.,
fewer yields), indicating an effect of age on suggestibility in preschool aged children. A follow
up ANOVA with Fishers LSD post hoc comparisons was run to determine between which age
groups this significant difference existed. Results revealed a significant effect of age, F (2, 87) =
4.81, p = .01, with a significant difference between 3- and 5-year-olds, p = .003, only. See Table
6 for mean yield 1 scores by age.
In step 2, three EF tasks were entered to determine whether EF contributed to the
concurrent prediction of yield 1 scores above and beyond that accounted for by age. This step
was not significant and only explained an incremental 2.12% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (3,
85) = 0.67, p = .57, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age. In addition, none of the
coefficients related to the individual EF predictors were significant, indicating that the individual
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EF elements did not significantly influence total suggestibility once age was accounted for in the
model.
In step 3, attention (i.e., either DA or FA) was entered to test the prediction that those in
the DA paradigm would have a higher yield 1 score than those in the FA paradigm. This step
was marginally significant and explained an incremental 3.59% of variance in yield 1 scores, F
(1, 84) = 3.49, p = .065, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age and EF. Results
indicated that attention may influence yield 1 scores. Specifically, children in the DA condition
(M = 7.87, SD = 3.86) had higher scores than those in the FA condition (M = 6.51, SD = 3.22),
suggesting that DA is may relate to higher suggestibility.
Step 4 tested the interaction between DA condition and age on yield 1 scores, this step
was not significant and explained an incremental 0.09% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (1, 83) =
0.09, p = .77, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age, EF, and attention. Results
suggest that age has no influence on the effect of DA on suggestibility to yield 1 scores.
Finally, to test the prediction that the influence of DA on yield 1 scores would differ by
EF performance step 5 included the interaction of each EF task and level of attention. Results
indicated these interactions were not significant and explained an incremental 0.60% of variance
in yield 1 scores, F (3, 80) = 0.19, p = .91, suggesting the influence of DA on yield 1 scores did
not significantly differ by EF performance.
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Table 7
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Children; Influences of Yield 1 Scores (Coefficients Listed by Step)

Block 1
Exact Age
Block 2
Grass/Snow Stroop (No. correct out of
16)
DCCS (No. correct on postswitch trials)
SOPT (No. correct out of 40)
Block 3
Attention (DA/FA)
Block 4
Exact Age by Level of Attention
Block 5
Stroop by Attention
DCCS by Attention
SOPT by Attention

B

SE B

β

ΔR2

CI 95%

.08
-1.28

0.47

-.28
.02

-0.24
0.27
-0.39

.38
0.42
0.40

-.07
.08
-.11

Significance
.007
-2.21 - -0.35
.007
.57
-0.99 - 0.52
-0.56 - 1.10
-1.19 - 0.42

.04
1.36

0.73

.19

-0.09 - 2.81
.001

-0.28

0.94

-.18

-2.15 - 1.59
.006

-0.55
-0.24
0.15

0.77
0.85
0.83

-.11
-.05
.03

-2.08 - 0.99
-1.93 - 1.44
-1.51 - 1.80

.53
.52
.34
.07
.07
.77
.77
.91
.48
.78
.86
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Variable

Adults. Results from the hierarchical regression are presented in Table 8. In the first step,
age was entered as a continuous variable to test the prediction that age would influence yield 1
scores. Results indicated that age was not a significant predictor of yield 1 scores, accounting for
only 0.40% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (1, 76) = 0.31, p = .58, suggesting that differences in
age in adults does not have an effect on suggestibility to yield 1 scores.
In step 2, three EF tasks were entered to determine whether EF contributed to the
concurrent prediction of yield 1 scores above and beyond that accounted for by age. This step
was not significant and explained an incremental 3.39% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (3, 73) =
0.86, p = .47, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age. In addition, none of the
individual EF coefficients significant, indicating that the individual EF elements did not
significantly influence yield 1 scores once age was accounted for in the model.
In step 3, attention (i.e., either DA or FA) was entered to test the prediction that those in
the DA paradigm would have a higher yield 1 score than those in the FA paradigm. This step
was significant and explained an incremental 17.77% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (1, 72) =
16.13, p < .001, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age and EF. Specifically, adults
in the DA condition (M = 2.70, SD = 1.91) had higher yield 1 scores than those in the FA
condition (M = 1.15, SD = 1.31), suggesting that DA is related to higher suggestibility to yield 1
scores. Step 4 tested the interaction between DA condition and age on yield 1 scores, this step
was not significant and only explained an incremental 0.06% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (1,
71) = 0.06, p = .82, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age, EF, and attention.
Indicating that while attention influences yield 1 scores, attention does not influence yield 1
scores differently based on age.
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Finally, to test the prediction that the influence of DA on yield 1 scores would differ by
EF performance, step 5 included the interaction of each EF task and level of attention. Results
indicated these interactions were not significant and explained an incremental 4.24% of variance
in yield 1 scores, F (3, 68) = 1.29, p = .28. Suggesting that the effect of DA on yield 1 scores is
not influenced by EF performance.

53

Variable
Block 1
Exact Age
Block 2
Color Stroop (Interference score)
DCCS (No. correct on postswitch trials)
SOPT (No. correct out of 40)
Block 3
Attention (DA/FA)
Block 4
Exact Age by Attention
Block 5
Stroop by Attention
DCCS by Attention
SOPT by Attention

B
0.07

SE B
0.12

β

ΔR2
.004
.06

CI 95%
-0.18 - 0.31

.034
-0.14
0.26
-0.22

0.21
0.23
0.21

-.08
.13
-.12

-0.55 - 0.28
-0.20 - 0.71
-0.64 - 0.20
.18

1.58

0.39

.44

0.80 - 2.37
.001

0.07

0.30

.42

-0.52 - 0.66
.04

0.23
0.46
0.55

0.57
0.42
0.39

.12
.19
.21

-0.90 - 1.37
-0.38 - 1.31
-0.22 - 1.33

Significance
.58
.58
.47
.52
.26
.30
.00
.00
.81
.81
.28
.68
.28
.16
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Table 8
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Adults; Influences of Yield 1 Scores (Coefficients Listed by Step)

Comparing adult and child samples (Age, EF, and Divided Attention) on yield 1
scores. In addition to running adult and child samples individually, I also wanted to investigate
the effects of age (i.e., comparing younger children to older children and children to adults) on
yield 1 scores.
To compare the adult and child samples a single GLM was conducted on yield 1 scores
with age (discrete), EF tasks (z scores for DCCS, SOPT, Stroop), attention (DA/FA), age by
attention interaction, and EF by attention interaction. This analysis revealed a significant main
effect of age on yield 1 scores F (1, 158) = 81.61, p < .001. A follow up one-way ANOVA with
Fishers LSD post hoc comparisons was conducted to determine how age contributed to yield 1
scores. For the purpose of this analysis age entered as a discrete variable (i.e., grouped by 3-, 4-,
5- year-olds, and adults) was a significant predictor of yield 1 scores, F (3, 166) = 54.99, p <
.001. While 3-year-olds (M = 8.57, SD = 3.32) have the highest yield 1 scores followed by 4year-olds (M = 7.20, SD = 3.44), then 5-year-olds (M = 5.80, SD = 3.60), with adults (M = 1.93,
SD = 1.81) having the lowest yield 1 scores, there is only a significant difference between 3- and
5-year-olds, and all three age groups for children (i.e., 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds) and adults ps <
.001, see Figure 6. Results suggest that there is an influence of age on yield 1 scores, with
younger children being more suggestible than older children and children in general being more
suggestible than adults. All other variables did not significantly relate to yield 1 scores ps > .18.
Divided Attention Results
This study is one of the first to introduce a divided attention task during an eyewitness
event in the preschool years. To ensure that our divided attention paradigm did in fact divide
attention, several analyses were run. Since children were given a different divided attention task
than adults, separate analyses were run for each sample.
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Children. One way to check whether the divided attention paradigm divided attention is
to look at the answers to non-suggestive questions. Of the 18 questions asked, four are nonsuggestive and should be answered “yes” rather than “no”. It would be expected that those in the
FA condition would answer more of these non-suggestive questions correctly than those in the
DA condition, given that they would have paid more attention to the video and there is no
suggestive influence on those questions. A linear regression was run to determine the effect of
attention condition on assents to non-suggestive questions. Results revealed no significant effect
of attention condition on assents to non-suggestive questions for children, F (1, 88) = 2.157, p =
.15, suggesting that DA did not impair memory for non-suggestive questions. More specifically,
51.1% of children in the FA condition assented to all non-suggestive questions, while 40% of
children in the DA condition assented to all non-suggestive questions. While there were more
children correctly answering non-suggestive questions (i.e., assenting) in the FA condition when
compared to the DA condition, this difference was not significant.
Another way to check whether attention was divided during the DA paradigm was to
compare performance on the Days/Night Stroop DA task used to divide attention to performance
on the Day/Night Stroop task given at the end of the session. Since there were unequal trials
between the two tasks, performance was converted into proportion correct to compare in a paired
samples t-test. Results revealed no significant difference between performance on the Day/Night
Stroop during the DA paradigm (M = .87, SD = .21) when compared to performance on the
Day/Night Stroop at the end of the session (M = .87, SD = .16) for children, t (44) = -.112, p =
.91.
Adults. One way to check whether the divided attention paradigm divided attention is to
look at the answers to non-suggestive questions. Of the 18 questions asked, four are non56

suggestive and should be answered “yes” rather than “no”. It would be expected that those in the
FA condition would answer more of these non-suggestive questions correctly than those in the
DA condition, given that they would have paid more attention to the video and there is no
suggestive influence on those questions. A linear regression was run to determine the effect of
condition on assents to non-suggestive questions. Results revealed no significant effect of
condition on assents to non-suggestive questions for adults, F (1, 78) = 1.362, p = .25. More
specifically, 70% of adults in the FA condition assented to all non-suggestive questions, while
62.5% of adults in the DA condition assented to all non-suggestive questions. While there were
more adults correctly answering non-suggestive questions (i.e., assenting) in the FA condition
when compared to the DA condition, this difference was not significant.
Another way to check whether attention was divided during the DA paradigm was to
compare performance on the Days/Night Stroop DA task to performance on the Day/Night
Stroop task given at the end of the session. Since there were unequal trials between the two tasks,
performance was converted into proportion correct to compare in a paired samples t-test. Results
revealed no significant difference between performance on the DA Day/Night Stroop (M = .99,
SD = .02) when compared to performance on the delay Day/Night Stroop (M = .99, SD = .02) for
adults, t (39) = -.54, p = .59. These results reveal that performance on the Day/Night Stroop was
not affected by the DA task.
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IV Discussion
The current study sought to examine the influences of cognitive abilities (i.e., EF and
DA) on suggestibility through misleading questions in preschoolers and adults. Also, of interest
was how age differences may play a role in their influence on suggestibility to misleading
questions. There were three major findings of the study. First, children’s total suggestibility and
yield 1 scores were much higher than adults, however there were only age differences in
preschoolers for yield 1 scores. Second, EF did not influence total suggestibility or yield 1 scores
in either child or adult populations. Third, while dividing attention did not have any negative
effects on total suggestibility in children, it did influence total suggestibility in adults and was
related to an increase in yield 1 scores for both children and adults, although the increase in yield
1 scores was only marginal for children. These results indicate that age and attention influence
suggestibility to misleading questions, however, in the present study EF was not found to have
an effect on one’s vulnerability to misleading questions.
Age and Suggestibility. Several researchers have found that age is negatively related to
suggestibility, with younger children being more suggestive than older children and adults
(Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Ceci et al., 1987; Cohen & Harnick, 1980; Ornstein,
Gordon, & Larus, 1992). Results of this study showed a significant effect of age on total
suggestibility and yield 1 scores, with preschoolers being more suggestible to misleading
questions than adults, supporting previous research findings (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Cohen &
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Harnick, 1980). It has been suggested that children are more suggestive than adults
because of social pressure and immature but developing cognitive processes (Ceci & Bruck,
1993).
When examining total suggestibility within our preschool sample, our results did not
reveal any age differences between the three age groups. Given that Scullin and Ceci (2001)
suggested yield 1 scores may be a better indicator of suggestibility than total suggestibility scores
(see also, McFarlane & Powell, 2002; Scullin & Bonner, 2006; Scullin & Ceci, 2001), yield 1
scores were also examined as a measure of suggestibility. Results revealed a significant
difference between 3- and 5-year-olds on yield 1 scores, with 3-year-olds being more suggestible
than 5-year-olds. Further, children were found to have higher yield 1 scores than adults,
revealing greater suggestibility to misleading questions in children than adults. These finding
supports previous research findings of a negative relationship between age and suggestibility, as
age increases suggestibility has been found to decrease (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck,
1993; Ceci et al., 1987; Cohen & Harnick, 1980; Ornstein, Gordon, & Larus, 1992).
Yield 1 scores are ultimately one’s initial vulnerability to a misleading question, it is the
number of assents to suggestive questions. Whereas, total suggestibility is a combination of both
yield 1 scores and shift scores, recall shift scores are the number of times one changes their
answer to questions asked previously when given negative feedback. Thus, total suggestibility
scores reflect two types of suggestibility, suggestibility to misleading questions but also
suggestibility to repeated questioning. Researchers suggested the use of yield 1 scores over total
suggestibility to measure suggestibility in preschoolers (Scullin & Ceci, 2001), theoretically this
approach makes more sense as it reflects a single measure of suggestibility (i.e., vulnerability to
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misleading questions). In addition, yield 1 scores are a better measure of suggestibility for the
present study since misleading questions were the type of suggestibility of interest.
EF and Suggestibility. The current study did not find any relationship between EF and
total suggestibility or yield 1 scores in either the child or adult populations. This is contrary to
previous research findings. For instance, two of the three main EF components; inhibition
(Alexander et al., 2002; Clarke-Stewart, Malloy, & Allhusen, 2004; Kapinski & Scullin, 2009;
Roberts & Powell, 2005) and WM (Clarke-Steward et al., 2004; Kapinski & Scullin, 2009) have
been found to be related to suggestibility in children.
However, while many researchers have found different EF components to be related to
suggestibility, a review article found that half (i.e., nine out of 18 and possibly more unpublished
work) of the studies that examined the relationship between EF and suggestibility in children did
not find a significant relationship between EF and suggestibility (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). Many
of these studies examined children under the age of 7-years-old, leading researchers to suggest
that null findings between EF and suggestibility may be due to the young population used and
that there may be correlations between EF and suggestibility in older children who are in the
process of EF growth (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). However, this argument may not be valid given
there are major developments in EF processes within the preschool age years (Garon et al., 2008;
Jacques & Marcovitch, 2010). Further young age does not seem to be a valid argument, in the
present study EF was not found to be a significant predictor in adults, where EF is considered
fully developed (Jacques & Marcovitch, 2010).
Perhaps the inability to find a relationship between EF and suggestibility could be
explained by performance on EF tasks, in that EF tasks chosen may have proven to be too easy
for the age groups assessed. Previous research has found inhibition and WM to be related to
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suggestibility, however in the present study participants regardless of age performed at ceiling on
measures of inhibition (i.e., Grass/Snow Stroop & Day/Night Stroop) as evidenced by the lack of
correlations with age and lack of variability in this measure—this may explain why there was not
a relationship between inhibition and suggestibility. Performance on the DCCS (measuring
cognitive flexibility) and SOPT (measuring WM) was positively correlated with age, as would be
expected. However, cognitive flexibility has not previously been found to be related to
suggestibility, and findings from this study were no different. This is likely due to cognitive
flexibility’s late development compared to other components of EF (Garon et al., 2008). While
WM has previously been found to be related to suggestibility, that was not the case in this study.
While there was some variability in the WM measure, the inability to find a link between this
component of EF and suggestibility may lie within the measure of WM. For instance, counting
span, word span, and backward digit span tasks are frequently used as measures for WM in
research with suggestibility in young children (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). The SOPT was chosen
because the backward digit span has proven to be difficult for 3- and 4-year-olds (Vandenbrink
& Miller, 2019), however the SOPT may have been too easy for this age group as performance
on the SOPT was negatively skewed for both 4- and 5-year-olds. While performance on the
SOPT was correlated with age, scores were still very high for older children and there may not
have been enough variability for there to be a relationship between this measure of WM and
suggestibility. In addition, the child version of the SOPT was created from the same source as the
images in the SOPT used by Cragg and Nation (2007), however the chosen images and
placement of images may have been different and may have resulted in an easier WM task than
intended for this age.
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There are a number of theoretical reasons for why EF should be related to suggestibility.
For example, higher order cognitive processes in EF are believed to assist in encoding and
retrieval of information from long-term memory (Alexander et al., 2002; Miller, Chatley,
Marcovitch, & McConnell Rogers, 2014; Schacter, Kagan, & Leichtman, 1995). EF is required
to form a strong representation of the event for storage in long-term memory, to resist the urge to
automatically pull from familiarity in memory (Kelley & Jacoby, 2000) and to consciously
reflect on the appropriate memory trace (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009). These three actions that
allow one to form a memory that can accurately be recalled all rely on EF. Thus, drawing on
ones EF should decrease the likelihood of suggestibility. While I expected EF to influence
suggestibility and theoretically it made sense for EF to influence suggestibility, it is possible that
there may be other cognitive and social abilities that are more related to suggestibility than EF.
For instance, the present study found that attention influenced suggestibility. Currently results
are inconclusive as to why EF was not related to suggestibility and future research is necessary to
determine whether there is a relationship between EF and suggestibility, as current findings are
mixed.
DA and Suggestibility. Previous research has found that DA during a witnessed event
has negative consequences on memory for the event (Zaragoza & Lane, 1998; Lane, 2006),
specifically DA during encoding of eyewitness memory can lead to errors in adults’ recall
(Anderson et al., 2000; Craik et al., 1996; Fernades & Moscovitch, 2000; Kellog, Cocklin, &
Bourne, 1982; Park, Smith, Dudley, & Lafronza, 1989). Findings from this study support
previous research on DA and suggestibility in adults. Specifically, the present study found that
adults who were in the DA condition during witnessing an event had higher total suggestibility
and yield 1 scores compared to adults who were in the FA condition. In addition, findings from
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the present study were able to extend previous research findings of DA’s negative effects on
memory to a younger age. The present study found that dividing attention in preschoolers has a
marginal negative effect on memory, resulting in higher assents to misleading questions.
These findings align with the theoretical perspective suggesting that when attention is
required to process multiple stimuli or perform multiple tasks simultaneously the result is
diminished memory recall (Anderson et al., 2000; Craik et al., 1996; Fernades & Moscovitch,
2000; Kellog, Cocklin, & Bourne, 1982; Park, Smith, Dudley, & Lafronza, 1989), as was seen in
the present study. Attention was divided between witnessing an event and performing a task
simultaneously, which inhibited the executive attention network to properly encode critical
details of the witnessed event into long-term memory, resulting in poorer memory recall. When
attention is divided between multiple stimuli a less elaborate memory representation for the
event is created (Lane, 2006) causing gaps within the memory representations of the event.
Recall that when memory representations are missing information we often try to fill in the gaps
(Greenberg, Westcott, & Bailey, 1998), which is likely why both children and adults who
experienced the DA condition were more vulnerable to the misinformation that was provided to
them in the misleading questions than those in the FA condition, resulting in higher assents to
false statements.
Developing attention systems may be one possible explanation for why DA’s effect on
suggestibility in children was only marginal. During preschool children are still relying on the
orienting or selective attention system where their attention is guided by their environment, while
their executive attention network is developing (Garon et al., 2008). Without the assistance of the
executive attention network to allocate attention to a single desired event, their attention may be
easily pull in multiple directions between multiple events. I believe the marginal effect of DA on
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suggestibility is likely due to children’s underdeveloped executive attention network, resulting in
children in the FA condition also experiencing effects of DA, though not intentional through the
design of the study. For instance, attention could be divided between the video and other stimuli
in the environment as well as internal events. From this theoretical reasoning I believe that as
children’s executive attentional network develops the effects of DA on suggestibility will begin
to look similar to the relationship that is seen in adult populations. Thus, this difference in DA’s
influence on suggestibility between children and adults is likely due to the development of the
executive attention system.
To my knowledge this is one of the first studies to conduct a DA paradigm within an
eyewitness event for preschool age children. While DA did not influence total suggestibility in
children, it did have a marginal effect on yield 1 scores in children. Children in the DA condition
had higher yield 1 scores than those in the FA condition, suggesting that DA is related to higher
assents to misleading questions in children. Future research should investigate the effects of DA
on a wider age span in children to assist in determining the influence it may have on children’s
suggestibility.
In addition, the marginal effect of DA on suggestibility in children may have a less
theoretical explanation. The DA paradigm itself may not have effectively divided attention in
children. Children should have been able to sort all 54 cards within the 5 minutes given to them,
which is how long the video was. However, the majority of children did not sort all 54 cards,
suggesting that their attention may have been focus more on the video than on the game. While
attention could have been divided between the two tasks, it may have been performance on the
Day/Night Stroop that suffered rather than details about the video. While children’s performance
on the DA Day/Night Stroop and delay Day/Night Stroop was not significantly different, it may
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be that children performed equally well because when they did sort cards in the DA Day/Night
Stroop they sorted them correctly, however the time it took for them to sort the cards may have
been longer than the time it took them to sort cards in the delay Day/Night Stroop. In addition, of
the 54 cards available to sort during the task, 20% of children sorted all 54 cards. Children’s
tendency to allocate attention to the video more so than the game may explain why the effects of
the DA condition were only marginal. Further, when examining the DA paradigm in adults, of
the 100 cards available for adults to sort during the task, 74.5% of adults sorted all the cards. The
majority of adults were able to sort all cards throughout the 5-minute video, suggesting that their
attention was divided between the two events as was reflected in the significant effect of DA on
suggestibility in the adult population.
Divided attention paradigm. The manipulation used to divide attention within this study
was novel, as to my knowledge there were no existing divided attention paradigms that involved
witnessing an event in a child population used in previous research. For this reason, it was
important to examine whether the DA paradigm was effective in dividing attention. Analyses
examined performance on the secondary task of the paradigm (i.e., the Day/Night Stroop)
compared to performance on the Day/Night Stroop during the delay. Results revealed no
significant difference between performance on the DA Day/Night Stroop when compared to
performance on the delay Day/Night Stroop for children or adults. These results reveal that
performance on the Day/Night Stroop was not affected by the DA task. However, it is important
to note that the DA Day/Night Stroop for adults was not as similar to the delay Day/Night Stroop
as it was in children, since the adult version contained two addition sorting rules and cards (i.e.,
Grass and Snow cards). Thus, it may not be reasonable to draw conclusions regarding DA by
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comparing performance on these two tasks. While this was one way to check whether the DA
paradigm was effective, it may not be the best measure of whether attention was divided.
A second way to check whether the divided attention paradigm divided attention is to
look at the answers to non-suggestive questions. It was thought that participants in the FA
condition would have more assents to non-suggestive questions than those in the DA condition,
if the DA paradigm was effective in dividing attention. Results revealed no significant effect of
attention condition on assents to non-suggestive questions for children or adults suggesting that
DA did not impair memory for non-suggestive questions. The present study was able to find an
effect of DA on suggestibility which suggests the DA paradigm was effective. However, the
manipulation checks may not be measuring whether the paradigm divided attention as it was
intended to. Future research is needed to find a valid and reliable manipulation check for the DA
paradigm to ensure that attention is divided when participants are in this condition.
Conclusions. One possible explanation for not finding expected relations between
cognitive abilities and total suggestibility to misleading questions may be the tool used for
implementing suggestibility, the VSSC. By the authors own admission, in 2006 the VSSC was
yet to be verified as a reliable tool for assessing children’s suggestibility (Scullin & Bonner,
2006). Researcher’s suggested that further research would be needed to determine the VSSC’s
utility as a tool for assessing children’s suggestibility and perhaps this research may lend itself as
just that. The findings from this study would suggest that perhaps the video, the questions (both
suggestive and non-suggestive), or the combination of both are not creating the appropriate tool
to measure suggestibility to misleading questions in children. Further, previous findings from use
with the VSSC show that it is much more likely that the yield 1 scores are a better predictor of
suggestibility than the total suggestibility score (Scullin & Bonner, 2006; Scullin & Ceci, 2001).
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Researchers have even suggested that the yield 1 scores may be acceptable as a measure of
overall suggestibility (Scullin & Warren, 1999, as cited in Scullin & Ceci, 2001). Thus, future
research should focus on yield 1 scores as a measure of suggestibility rather than total
suggestibility scores as this study adds to the findings that yield 1 scores are a better measure of
suggestibility in children.
In conclusion, the present study was able to replicate findings of the negative relationship
between age and suggestibility. Further, this study was able to replicate the relationship between
DA and suggestibility in adults and to extend this relationship to a younger age than previously
examined. Lastly, the present study was not able to find a relationship between EF and
suggestibility in children or adults.
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Appendix A
Leading Questions & Video Suggestibility Scale for Children (Video SSC; Scullin & Ceci,
2001):
S; suggestive questions, NS; non-suggestive questions. 1) Did the two girls arrive at the
party in a bright red car? (S). 2) Was there a girl named Suzie at the party? (NS). 3) Was there a
little white doggie at the party? (S). 4) Did that clumsy girl Robin knock over the lamp? (S). 5)
Did the kids break a balloon while they were hitting them around? (S). 6) Did Robin trip and fall
on the way to the table? (NS). 7) When the clown juggled, did he drop a ball? (S). 8) Was Billy
going to bring his new football to school the next day? (S). 9) Was one of Billy’s birthday
presents broken when he opened it? (NS). 10) Did Billy break the toy? (S). 11) Did Billy and his
friends play with the broken toy after Billy’s dad fixed it? (S). 12) Did Billy’s dad cut the
birthday cake? (S). 13) When Robin dropped the cake on her lap, did she just go ahead and eat
it? (NS). 14) When Billy spilled his juice, did he cry? (S), 15) Did Billy get the last piece of
cake? (S). 16) Did Billy’s dad tell the kids that there wasn’t a real fire? (S). 17) Did Billy feel ‘all
grown up’ now that he was five years old? (S). 18) Did Billy’s friends stay overnight? (S).
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Appendix B
Video Suggestibility Scale for Children (Video SSC): The scale measures
suggestibility in two dimensions; Yield, the initial response to the misleading questions. Shift,
after responding to the initial questions mild negative feedback is given (e.g. ‘you missed a few
of the questions. Let’s go through them again and see if you can do better this time’) and the
questions are administered again. Total suggestibility is the combination of scores on the two
dimensions (i.e., yield and shift).
Yield 1: Children are given a score of 1 if they assent to a leading question. Four of the
questions are true and thus cannot be scored (but are included in questioning) for this part of the
analysis resulting in a range of scores from 0-14.
Yield 2: Children are given a score of 1 if they assent to a leading question after
receiving negative feedback (i.e., ‘you missed a few of the questions. Let’s go through them
again and see if you can do better this time’) from the experimenter and the question is repeated.
Again the 4 true questions cannot be scored (but are included in questioning) for this part of the
analysis resulting in a range of scores from 0-14.
Shift: During questioning the child is told “you missed a few of the questions. Let’s go
through them again and see if you can do better this time.” If the child changes their response
after hearing this they are given a 1. The 4 true questions were included resulting a range of
scores from 0-18.
Total suggestibility: A composite suggestibility score was created by summing Yield 1
and Shift scores, resulting in a range of scores from 0-32.
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